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judge's ruling in Cooper. It is now only necessary, in order to
complain of a ruling sustaining a challenge for cause, that de-
fense counsel's "peremptory challenges shall have been ex-
hausted before completion of the panel." A similar liberal ap-
proach should be taken where improper rulings on voir dire
have prevented a fair examination of a prospective juror, and
the defense is forced to eliminate that juror by peremptory
challenge. In such cases there is substantial injury through the
probable future need for the peremptory challenge exercised.
It is not necessary to take the extra step required by Breedlove
and to challenge an additional juror who, after being thus an-




Article 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically pro-
vides that a district court may adopt local rules regulating the
conduct of judicial business before it.' It stipulates that such
rules shall be entered in the court minutes and printed in
pamphlet form, and, further, that on request a copy of the
pamphlet shall be furnished to any attorney licensed to practice
in this state.2 Of course, there is no need to "prove" the existence
of a local rule of court to the trial court; it takes judicial notice
of it.3 Thus, from the standpoint of the lower court there is no
need to have evidence in the record as to the rules of court.
When a case goes up to an appellate court on writs or on
appeal and concerns compliance with a particular local rule of
court, should the appellate court judicially notice the provision
of the local rule? Sciortino v. Sciortino4 presented the question
full force. Defendant had been adjudged guilty of contempt for
wilful refusal to pay a child support award, and sentenced to ten
days in jail by a judge of the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs. Relator
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 193 (1960).
2. For the authority of district courts to adopt local rules of court for
the conduct of criminal cases, see LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 18 (1966). For the
authority of city courts to adopt rules of court, see LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4847
(1960).
3. See Wallace v. Martin, 166 So. 874 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936), and C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 327 (1954).
4. 250 La. 727, 198 So.2d 905 (1967).
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grounded his defense on his interpretation of a purported local
rule of court, but no certified copy of the local rules had been
filed in the record. The Supreme Court, relying upon prior juris-
prudence, declined to consider the contention, stating "it is well
settled that this court cannot take judicial notice of the rules
of a district court."P
5
With deference, the writer submits that Louisiana's position
on this point should be changed. Unquestionably a trial court
properly notices its own rules, and the better reasoned American
position appears to be that an appellate court should judicially
notice that which the trial judge properly judicially noticed.6
Otherwise, to use the late Professor McMahon's frequent phrase,
there seems to exist an unnecessary "trap for the unwary."
Although there is clear precedent in support of the court's
decision, the Louisiana rule seems unnecessarily technical, par-
ticularly so since, under the Code of Civil Procedure,7 local
rules must now be printed in pamphlet form and any attorney
has the legal right to be furnished a copy. If the court felt it
desirable to adhere to the prior Louisiana position relative to
judicial notice in such cases, it would seem preferable, in the
interest of a fair presentation of all of the issues, to have
remanded the instant case for the introduction into the record
of the rules of court, rather than to have decided the case on
its merits without consideration of relator's contentions relative
to the purported rule.
IMPEACHMENT
Prior Contradictory Statements
State v. Barbars concerned an attempt by the state to im-
peach its own witness by proof of prior contradictory statements.
It is an important and interesting case, devoted in its entirety
to a discussion of impeachment.9 One of the state's star wit-
nesses told a story contrary to that given in a signed written
statement made to the police prior to trial. At the trial, over
objection, the state's attorney read the prior statement to the
5. Id. at 732, 198 So.2d at 907.
6. See C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EV)INCE §§ 327 and 330 (1954).
7. LA. CODE Crv. P. art. 193 (1960).
8. 250 La. 509, 197 So.2d 69 (1967).
9. For other cases decided during the term relative to impeachment of
one's own witnesses, see State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So.2d 417 (1966);
State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966).
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witness, 0 who admitted having made it. Over objection, the
statement was then offered in evidence by the state, without any
caution by the court as to its proper use by the jury. The out-
of-court statement was the only evidence connecting the defen-
dants with the crime.
The Supreme Court, relying on principle and prior cases,
held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that
the prior statement was to be used solely to impeach or tear down
the testimony of the witness on the stand, and was not to be
given substantive weight, was reversible error. The court found
that the failure of the defendant to request the cautionary in-
struction did not relieve the trial court of the responsibility to
caution the jury that the prior contradictory statement was not
to be used as substantive evidence in determining the guilt of
the defendant. It went on to say that the caution should be given
contemporaneously with the introduction of the prior state-
ment, and that delaying until the court's general instruction to the
jury at the close of all of the testimony is unsatisfactory. The
reason that an out-of-court statement is not to be given substan-
tive weight is that to do so would be violative of the hearsay
rule, for it would be permitting an out-of-court statement not
under oath or subject to cross-examination to be used to prove
the truth of the out-of-court utterance.
Actually, it appears that, under Louisiana law, the written
statement itself should have been inadmissible, with or without
cautionary instruction. Many courts, buttressed by Professor
McCormick, 1" take the position that, since ostensibly the sole
purpose for inquiring into the out-of-court statement is to im-
peach or tear down the testimony of the witness on the stand,
the fact that the witness admits having made the statement pre-
cludes admissibility. Dean Wigmore argues the contrary. 2 In
any event, for Louisiana, it seems clear from pertinent juris-
prudence, 3 and definitely implied by Louisiana R.S. 15.493,14 that,
10. As to impeachment of a witness by use of a prior written statement,
see C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 28 (1954); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1260
(3d ed. 1940); State v. Callegari, 41 La. Ann. 578, 7 So. 130 (1889).
11. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 37 (1954).
12. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1037, nos. 4 and 5 and accompanying text
(3d ed. 1940).
13. State v. Folden, 135 La. 791, 66 So. 223 (1914); State v. Goodbier, 48
La. Ann. 770, 19 So. 755 (1896).
14. LA. R.S. 15:493 (1950): "Whenever the credibility of a witness is to be
impeached by proof of any statement made by him contradictory to his testi-
mony, he must first be asked whether he has made such statement, and his
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if the witness unequivocally admits having made the contra-
dictory statement, the statement itself is inadmissible.
OPrNION
State of Mind
In two important and interesting cases,15 very damaging
opinion-type testimony was held properly admissible on the
grounds that it showed "state of mind" and explained certain
conduct on the part of the witness. With deference, this writer
feels that in both cases the testimony should have been ex-
cluded. Since both concern essentially the same problem, only
one will here be discussed.
State v. Rideau" (in its third appearance before the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court) 17 was one of the two cases. The Rideau
case concerns a murder prosecution which arose out of a bank
robbery. Three bank employees were taken by the robber to an
uninhabited rural area where all three were shot and one
stabbed. The one who was stabbed died, but both of the other
two lived and testified as witnesses against Rideau. One, over
objection, was permitted to testify that, after being shot, he
"heard two more shots, and 'felt that one of these shots was
evidently for Mrs. Ferguson and one of them for Mrs. McCain.' "18
Apparently the witness had not seen the defendant shoot the
other two, but had inferred what he "felt" from hearing the
shots and the totality of the circumstances. Rejecting the claim
that the testimony was "inadmissible speculation," the court held
it was admissible to show the witness's state of mind and to
explain why he later returned to the locality to look for the
other two employees.
It seems to this writer that it was improper for the trial
court to permit the witness to testify to what he inferred from
attention must be called to the time, place and circumstances, and to the
person to whom the alleged statement was made, in order that the witness
may have an opportunity of explaining that which is prima facie contra-
dictory. If the witness does not distinctly admit making such statement,
evidence that he did make it is admissible."
15. State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So.2d 417 (1966); State v. Rideau,
249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1967).
16. 249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1967).
17. For earlier decisions concerning Rideau, see State v. Rideau, 242 La.
431, 137 So.2d 283 (1962); Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
State v. Rideau, 246 La. 451, 165 So.2d 282 (1964).
18. 249 La. 1111, 1131, 193 So.2d 264, 272 (1967).
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the circumstances. It appears that the state of mind of the wit-
ness was not really an issue in the case, nor is it suggested by
the opinion that it was important to explain the witness's motive
in returning to the scene of the crime. If in fact the motive for
the witness's return to the scene had become an issue in the case
(and it is hard to see how), then, of course, it might have been
understandable to permit the district attorney to go into the
witness's motive. Even then, however, the propriety of the trial
court's action would seem questionable, for it might well be
unduly prejudicial to permit a witness to express an opinion on
a crucial question in the murder case-whether the defendant
shot the decedent-ostensibly for the purpose of explaining the
reason or motive for the witness to return to the scene. In any
event, the value of the testimony to show motive of the witness
seems outweighed by the great risk that the jury would use it
in determining whether the defendant had killed the decedent.
HEARSAY
Police Report
In Deville v. Aetna Ins. Co.,19 a personal injury case, de-
fendant had unsuccessfully attempted to introduce in evidence a
police report. Neither of the two officers who prepared the report
had testified as a witness; one was dead, and the other was out
of the state and no longer in police employ.? The Court of Appeal
for the Third Circuit quite properly affirmed the action of the
trial court in excluding the report as inadmissible hearsay.
It seems to this writer that a good argument can be made21
that we should devise a system for a thorough impartial investi-
gation of all significant automobile accidents with tape record-
ings of unbiased interrogation of witnesses by highly trained,
impartial, quasi-judicial personnel, and that the record of such
proceedings should be admissible in evidence. Absent a more
comprehensive system, with adequate safeguards to protect
against mistake, etc., it seems better to exclude police reports. In
any event, under the law as it now exists, the court of appeal
seems clearly correct.
19. 191 So.2d 324 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
20. A third officer signed the report and was present, but it appears that
he had not prepared the report and had merely directed traffic at the scene
of the accident.
21. See Pugh, Cross-Observations on the Administration of Civil Justice




In Liberty-Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bryant,22 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal took the position that a juvenile witness in a
civil case could not refuse to answer questions on the grounds
that answering them might subject him to delinquency proceed-
ings in a juvenile court, the court reasoning that such a juvenile
proceeding is not a "criminal proceeding" within the meaning of
the fifth amendment to the United States Consitution. Particu-
larly in light of the rationale of the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in In re Gault2 s discussing constitutional rights of
a person accused of juvenile delinquency, it appears that the
position of the court in the instant case does not reflect the
current state of the law.
Compromise with Third Party
Principally because of policy considerations-the desire to
encourage amicable settlement-offers to compromise are gen-
erally inadmissible as tending to show liability in civil cases.2 4
As was clearly pointed out in Broussard v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 25 another interesting case decided by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal, the same is generally true, and for basically the
same reasons, as to a plaintiff's agreement to compromise a tort
case with one of two allegedly joint tortfeasors, when the same
is offered by the second tortfeasor in an effort to show negligence
of the first. It was recognized that the agreement to compromise
(although not the amount of the compromise) might have a
proper relevance (to restrict the recovery because of the dis-
charge of one of the two tortfeasors, or as bearing upon the
claim for recovery under the "uninsured motorist" clause)-
but if such were to be the grounds of admissibility, the jury
should certainly be given a cautionary instruction as to the
restricted use of the proffered testimony.
22. 191 So.2d 747 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), writ refused, 250 La. 16, 193 So.2d
528 (1967).
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
24. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 76, 251 (1954).
25. 188 So.2d 111 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 713, 190
So.2d 233 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1967).
[Vol. XXVIH
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CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
As might be expected, a number of cases concerned the
admissibility of confessions and admissions (in both civil and
criminal cases). In light of Johnson v. State of New Jersey,26
limiting the retroactive effect of the famed Escobedo27 and Mi-
randa28 decisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in several
cases 29 that the admissibility of certain statements made by de-
fendants was not violative of their federal constitutional rights.
Pertinence of federal decisions relative to the admissibility
of statements by defendants did not, however, end there, for as
court and counsel seem to more and more recognize, federal
decisions in this important area have a pervasive significance. Not
surprisingly, several cases concerned the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained as a result of allegedly unconstitutional searches
and seizures.80
Foundation for Admissibility
Where the state seeks to introduce a confession or admission
involving criminal intent or inculpatory fact-made to one other
than law enforcement officials-does the rule requiring an affirm-
ative showing that the same was freely and voluntarily made8'
apply? The broad language of the statutory provision would seem
to be applicable, for it purports to be universal in scope.
82
Nevertheless, the court in dictim in State v. Evans83 expressed
"some doubt" upon the question. It is an intriguing and complex
problem which will no doubt receive further consideration by
the Louisiana courts.
26. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
27. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
28. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
29. See, for example, State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966);
State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966); State v. Gregoire, 249 La.
890, 192 So.2d 114 (1966); and State v. Ahrens, 250 La. 391, 196 So.2d 250 (1967).
30. State v. Brown, 249 La. 235, 186 So.2d 576 (1966); State v. Johnson,
249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966); State v. Williams, 250 La. 64, 193 So.2d
787 (1967); State v. Johnson, 250 La. 85, 193 So.2d 794 (1967); State v. Ahrens,
250 La. 391, 196 So.2d 250 (1967).
31. LA. R.S. 15:451 and 15:454 (1950).
32. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950):
"§ 451. Condition precedent to use of confession; free and voluntary
rule
"Before what purposes [purports] to be a confession can be Intro-
duced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and
voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation,
menaces, threats, inducements or promises."
33. 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966).
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Defense counsel should also take note of another aspect of
the Evans case. If one is to rely on appeal upon the trial judge's
failure to require the state to lay a foundation as to voluntariness
outside the presence of the jury, he may be required to show
that he unsuccessfully offered to traverse the evidence adduced
by the state. This line of reasoning seems to be based on the
notion that otherwise defendant would be unable to show preju-
dice. It seems to this writer, however, to be unduly technical.
It has long been settled in Louisiana 4 that for a confession
to be admissible the state must prove to the trial court beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confession was freely and voluntarily
given. This rule appears unquestionably sound, but at times the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in reviewing trial court determina-
tions of the voluntariness issue, seems to reflect undue reticence
-a reticence, incidentally, apparently not shared by the federal
courts.35 The language used in State v. Gregoire36 seems to this
writer to reflect too restrictive an attitude. After stating that the
evidence on the voluntariness question "preponderates" in favor
of voluntariness, the court said:
"The question of the admissibility of the verbal declara-
tion addressed itself to the trial judge, and his ruling will
not be disturbed unless it is clearly against the preponder-
ance of the evidence.3 7 (Emphasis added.)
In exercising its power of review over trial court determina-
tions, the court is, of course, concerned not simply with the
propriety of the trial court's decision, but also with its own
standard for reviewing such decisions. In view of the rigorous
burden placed upon the state to prove to the trial court volun-
tariness of the confession beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court should adopt a broad standard
to govern appellate review as to such questions.
Guilty Plea
Often civil and criminal cases both grow out of the same
incident-as, for example, an automobile accident. To what ex-
tent, if any, are the findings in the criminal traffic case admissible
34. State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So.2d 583 (1960); State v. Honey-
cutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So.2d 313 (1950); and see Comment, Confessions in Lou-
isana Law, 14 LA. L. REv. 642, 651 (1954), and cases therein collected.
35. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
36. 249 La. 890, 192 So.2d 114 (1966).
37. Id. at 907, 192 So.2d at 120.
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in the civil damage case? In Davis v. Bankston,88 Judge Tate
succinctly outlined the usual rules. In the civil case it is inad-
missible to show that one or the other of the parties was charged
by the police with a traffic violation. This would be merely the
opinion of the officer. Nor is it admissible in the civil case to
show that one or the other was found guilty. This, again, repre-
sents an opinion, and the majority of courts, including Louisi-
ana, would exclude it.s
It is to be noted, however, that there is a movement towards
admissibility of criminal findings in civil cases. The American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence 4 provided:
"Evidence of a subsisting judgment adjudging a person
guilty of a crime or a misdemeanor is admissible as tending
to prove the facts recited therein and every fact essential
to sustain the judgment."
The later Uniform Rules of Evidence,41 proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, did not
go so far. It would let in felony convictions only.4 Explaining
their position, the redactors of the Uniform Rules observed in
"comment" that:
". .. trials and convictions in traffic courts and possibly
in misdemeanor cases generally, often do not have about
them the tags of trustworthiness as they often are the result
of expediency or compromise. To let in evidence of convic-
tion of a traffic violation to prove negligence and responsi-
bility in a civil case would seem to be going too far and for
that reason this rule limits the admissibility of judgments
of conviction under the hearsay exception to convictions of
a felony. '48
38. 192 So.2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
39. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 295 (1954).
40. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 521 (1942).
41. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953).
42. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 63(20) provides:
"Rule 63. Hearsay Evidence Excluded-Exceptions. Evidence of a
statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence
and inadmissible except;
(20) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judg-
ment adjudging a person guilty of a felony, to prove any fact essential
to sustain the judgment .. "
43. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 63(20), comment p. 48 (1953).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
As Judge Tate properly pointed out, however, a different
situation is presented when a party litigant offers in evidence
his opponent's guilty plea to a criminal charge growing out of
the automobile accident which is the subject of the civil litiga-
tion. Here the guilty plea is admissible as an admission. The party
is not "bound" by the admission, however, and may be able to
"explain it away. '44
Vicarious Admissions
To what extent are the words and actions of a party liti-
gant's attorney admissible against the party litigant? If an at-
torney acts within the scope of his authority-to do or say a
particular thing-then the same is admissible against the client
to the same extent as though made or done by the client himself.
An intriguing question arises as to what authority will be in-
ferred from the fact of the attorney-client relationship itself-
a matter dealt with at considerable length in a very interesting
opinion by the Third Circuit in Pacholik v. Gray.45 In the Pacho-
lik case, a suit for return of a portion of a purchase price under
a contract to buy and sell real estate, the court held that the
lower court erred in refusing to permit the seller to introduce
testimony that the buyer's attorney (deceased at the time of the
trial), during the period allowed for curative title work, had
stated that the buyer did not intend to purchase whether or not
tender of merchantable title was timely made. The court of
appeal took the position that the statement was admissible not
on the premise that the attorney himself had authority to breach
the contract to buy, but on the proposition that "it was within the
apparent scope of his authority to communicate to the opposing
party his client-buyer's intention not to complete the sale despite
any curative work timely tendered. '46
Judicial Confessions
Is disserving testimony given by a party litigant on the stand
to be considered a "judicial confession" within the meaning of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2291? 47 The matter was not free from
44. See American Cas. Company v. Lennox, 169 So.2d 707 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964). Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the court
found that plaintiff was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the proffered
evidence.
45. 187 So.2d 480 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
46. Id. at 484.
47. LA. CivL CODE art. 2291: "The judicial confession is the declaration
[Vol. XXVII
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doubt.48 The question was involved in the courts of appeal de-
cisions in the Reynolds,49 Matchum,50 and Jackson5 cases; in
each, the Supreme Court granted writs to consider the matter. In
both Reynolds5 2 and Matchum,53 because of the nature of the
testimony there given, it was deemed unnecessary to reach the
ultimate issue. In Jackson,54 the court at last reached and de-
cided the question-in the negative.
After a thorough and persuasive analysis of the purpose
and function of Louisiana Civil Code article 2291 in its his-
torical context, Justice Sanders, speaking for a unanimous court,
concluded that article 2291 was never designed to apply, and
does not now apply, to disserving statements given by a party
litigant in testimony on the stand. In the opinion of this writer,
the result is a most felicitous one. It is now clear that a court is
not precluded from disbelieving a party litigant's disserving
testimony; it may decide the case on the entire record.
which the party, or his special attorney in fact, makes in a judicial proceed-
ing.
"It amounts to full proof against him who has made it.
"It can not be divided against him.
"It can not be revoked, unless it be proved to have been made through
an error in fact.
"It can not be revoked on a pretense of an error in law."
48. See discussion in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1961-1962 Term-Evidence, 23 LA. L. REv. 51, 406 (1963).
49. Reynolds v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 178 So.2d 412 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
50. Matchum v. Allstate Ins. Co., 180 So.2d 767 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
51. Jackson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 84 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
52. Reynolds v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 249 La. 268, 186 So.2d 588 (1966).
53. Matchum v. Allstate Ins. Co., 249 La. 1005, 192 So.2d 364 (1966).
54. Jackson v. Gulf Ins. Co., 250 La. 819, 199 So.2d 886 (1967).
